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ABSTRACT
We propose a new approach to securing self-organized mo-
bile ad hoc networks. In this approach, security is achieved
in a fully self-organized manner; by this we mean that the
security system does not require any kind of certification
authority or centralized server, even for the initialization
phase. In our work, we were inspired by PGP [15] be-
cause its operation relies solely on the acquaintances be-
tween users. We show that the small-world phenomenon
naturally emerges in the PGP system as a consequence of
the self-organization of users. We show this by studying
the PGP certificate graph properties and by quantifying its
small-world characteristics. We argue that the certificate
graphs of self-organized security systems will exhibit a simi-
lar small-world phenomenon, and we provide a way to model
self-organized certificate graphs. The results of the PGP
certificate graph analysis and graph modelling can be used
to build new self-organized security systems and to test the
performance of the existing proposals. In this work, we refer
to such an example.
Keywords: PGP, small-world graphs, public-key manage-
ment, self-organization
1. INTRODUCTION
Security in computer networks usually relies on central au-
thorities, certificate directories, or some preinstalled keys
and procedures. However, over the last decade, a very im-
portant change of paradigm has occurred: The concept of
self-organization has appeared in many communication sys-
tems. By self-organization, we mean that the system is oper-
ated solely by the end-users. The most interesting examples
include peer-to-peer systems, such as Gnutella1, Freenet2
and P-Grid [1]. In addition to the application layer, self-
organization has also emerged on the lower layers of the
1http://www.gnutella.com/
2http://freenetproject.org/
system architecture. An excellent example is a mobile ad
hoc network, where self-organization appears at the network
layer [11, 4, 5]: By definition, a mobile ad hoc network does
not rely on any fixed infrastructure; instead, all network-
ing functions (e.g., routing, mobility management, etc.) are
performed by the nodes themselves in a self-organizing man-
ner.
Due to the lack of centralized services in self-organized sys-
tems, these systems cannot be secured with the existing se-
curity solutions. This is not surprising, as these solutions
are devised mainly for the traditional wireline networks.
Nevertheless, in devising new security approaches for self-
organized systems, we use traditional cryptographic prim-
itives. In our view, the most appealing tool for securing
self-organized systems is public-key cryptography because it
enables the establishment of secure communication by the
exchange of public information and it supports key and user
authentication.
The main problem in all public-key security systems is: How
can a user u obtain the authentic public-key of another user
v in the presence of an active attacker [8, 10]? A common
approach to solving this problem is based on public-key cer-
tificates. A public-key certificate is a data structure in which
a public-key is bound to an identity (and possibly to some
other attributes) by the digital signature of the certificate
issuer. One of the most common approaches is that certifi-
cates are issued by a central authority (called certification
authority (CA)) that every user trusts. Every user knows
the CA’s public-key and thus can verify every certificate that
the CA issued. In self-organized systems, the functionality
of the CA can be distributed to the users, as proposed in [14,
7]. However, distributing the CA’s functionality, means del-
egating the authority to a subset of users, which makes this
approach impractical for fully self-organized systems.
In [10], we propose a different solution to the problem of
public key management in self-organized systems. In our
approach, each user is her own authority domain and users
issue public-key certificates to each other. Like in PGP,
key authentication is performed via a chain of certificates.
By this we mean that the key authentication is done in the
following way: When a user u wants to obtain the public
key of another user v, she acquires a chain of public-key
certificates such that
1. the first certificate of the chain can be directly verified
by u using a public key that u holds and trusts (e.g.,
her own public key),
2. each remaining certificate can be verified using the
public key contained in the previous certificate of the
chain, and
3. the last certificate contains the public key of the target
user v.
It is assumed that u trusts the issuer of each certificate in the
chain to correctly verify that the public key in the certificate
indeed belongs to the user name in the certificate.
However, contrary to PGP, our system does not rely on cer-
tificate directories for the distribution of certificates. In-
stead, certificates are stored and distributed by the users
and each user maintains a local certificate repository that
contains a limited number of certificates selected by the user
according to some algorithm. When user u wants to verify
the authenticity of the public key of user v, they merge their
local certificate repositories, and u tries to find an appropri-
ate certificate chain from u to v in the merged repository.
We have shown that there are algorithms for the construc-
tion of local certificate repositories such that any pair of
users can find, with high probability, certificate chains to
each other in their merged repository, even if the size of the
local repositories is small compared to the total number of
users in the system. This result shows that it is indeed pos-
sible to solve the public-key management problem in a fully
self-organized yet scalable way. This approach however pro-
vides only probabilistic guarantees and is dependent on the
characteristics of the certificate graph on which it operates.
A certificate graph is a directed graph G(V,E), where V is
a set of vertices, that represent public keys of the users, and
E is a set of edges, that represent public key certificates.
More precisely, there is a directed edge from vertex Ku to
vertex Kv if there is a certificate signed with Ku in which
Kv is bound to an identity.
In our work, we assumed that the certificate graphs in self-
organized systems exhibit certain properties. Specifically,
we assumed that the certificate graphs that might appear in
self-organized systems exhibit the small-world phenomenon.
A graph exhibits the small-world phenomenon if, roughly
speaking, any two vertices in the graph are likely to be con-
nected through a short sequence of intermediate vertices.
The small-world phenomenon was first introduced by Stan-
ley Milgram through a series of pioneering experiments that
he and his coauthors conducted in the 1960’s [9, 12]. The
goal of the experiments was to find short chains of acquain-
tances linking pairs of people in the United States who did
not know one another. The striking result was that the
average number of intermediate steps in a successful chain
was found to lie between five and six. This value has since
become popular as the “six degrees of separation” principle.
In this paper, we argue that the small-world phenomenon
naturally emerges in self-organized security systems. As an
example of such a system, we take PGP, where a certifi-
cate graph is created in a fully self-organized manner. We
further argue that in self-organized security systems, where
Figure 1: A transition from the ordered graph (1-
lattice) to the random graph.
users issue certificates based on their acquaintances, certifi-
cate graphs will exhibit small-world properties as a result of
their mutual trust relationships. In order to study different
security solutions for self-organized systems, we also propose
a certificate graph model. Among other things, our model
allows us to construct PGP-like graphs in a random manner
for simulation purposes.
A recent work on small-world graph models suggests sev-
eral reasons for the emergence of this phenomenon, both
in social networks, and in the World Wide Web [3, 6, 13,
2]. In their work, these authors propose several models of
small-world graphs. Naturally, as certificate graphs reflect
the social relations between people, they will exhibit similar
characteristics. Our analysis of PGP graphs shows that the
existing small-world models only partially model certificate
graphs. We therefore propose some modifications to these
models, to generate certificate graphs that might appear in
self-organized systems.
The four contributions of this work can be summarized as
follows: First, we present a detailed study of the charac-
teristics of the PGP certificate graphs. To our knowledge,
no such study has been made so far. However, an analy-
sis of some PGP certificate graph properties is available at
http://www.pgpi.org and http://pgp.dtype.org. Second, we
show that these graphs exhibit small-world properties and
we argue that PGP is a wonderful source of inspiration to
predict the way certificate graphs might emerge in fully self-
organized systems. Third, we demonstrate that the exist-
ing small-world graph models do not model the certificate
graphs appropriately. Fourth, we propose modifications of
the existing models to better characterize certificate graphs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the existing small-world graph models. In Section 3, we
present the analysis of the PGP certificate graphs. In Sec-
tion 4, we propose a model for the creation of the artificial
certificate graphs. In Section 5, we conclude and we give
some directions for future work.3
3The work presented in this paper was partially sup-
ported by the Swiss National Competence Center in Re-
search on Mobile Information and Communication Systems
(www.terminodes.org), a center supported by the Swiss Na-
tional Science Foundation under grant number 5005-67322.
2. MODELS OF SMALL-WORLD GRAPHS
Milgram’s seminal small-world experiment remains one of
the most compelling ways to think about the small-world
phenomenon. It succeeds in demonstrating that we are not
so far apart from each other and that the world is indeed a
very small place.
The small-world phenomenon was recently a matter of an
extensive study by Watts. In his book [13], Watts studies
the small-world phenomenon and he suggests that small-
world graphs lay somewhere in between ordered and com-
pletely random graphs. He illustrates this through several
small-world graph models, out of which the φ model, in our
opinion, is the most appealing one. In this model, small-
world graphs are created such that an ordered structure (a
1-lattice) is rewired randomly. By rewiring the lattice, in-
creasing randomness is introduced into a graph and, at the
same time, long range edges are created. This is illustrated
in Figure 1. These long range edges are called shortcuts, and
are defined as follows: a shortcut is an edge such that when
it is removed, the shortest path between the vertices previ-
ously connected by that edge becomes strictly larger than
two. The fraction of the shortcuts in the total number of
edges of a graph is called the φ coefficient and it determines
the level of randomness of the graph.
Here, a d-lattice is a labelled, unweighted, simple graph that
is similar to a Euclidean cubic lattice of dimension d in that
any vertex v is joined to its lattice neighbors, ui and wi, as
specified by
ui = [(v − id
′
) + n](mod n); wi = (v + i
d′)(mod n)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ k/2, 1 ≤ d′ ≤ d, and it is generally assumed
that k ≥ 2d. Here, k is a vertex degree and d is a lattice
dimension. Hence, a 1-lattice with k = 2 is a ring, a 2-lattice
with k = 4 is a two dimensional square grid, and so on (see
Figure 1 for an example of a 1-lattice with k = 4).
The φ model achieves three important properties of small-
world graphs: (i) high clustering, which reflects the fact
that small groups of people are very well interconnected and
that friends of a same friend are very likely mutual friends
as well; (ii) small average distance between two vertices;
(iii) logarithmic length scaling, that shows the small-world
phenomenon, as for all graph sizes, the average length of
shortest paths between the vertices is very small compared
to the graph size.
These three graph properties are formally expressed through
clustering coefficient, characteristic length and logarithmic
characteristic length scaling. The clustering coefficient of a
vertex v characterizes the extent to which vertices adjacent
to vertex v are adjacent to each other. It is defined as the
ratio of the number of edges between the vertices adjacent
to v to the total number of possible edges between the same
group of vertices. The clustering coefficient of a graph G
is then defined as the mean of the clustering coefficients of
all the vertices in G. The characteristic length of a graph
G is defined as the median of the means of the shortest
path lengths connecting each vertex to all other vertices in
G. Logarithmic length scaling means that the characteristic
length of a graph G scales logarithmically with the size of
G.
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Figure 2: The evolution of the size of the PGP
graph.
Therefore, a graph exhibits small-world properties if it has:
(i) a high clustering coefficient, (ii) a small characteristic
length, and (iii) a logarithmic characteristic length scaling.
One alternative to the model put forward by Watts is that
the small-world phenomenon arises not because there are
a few long-range connections in the otherwise short-range
structure of a social network, but because there are a few
vertices in the graph that have an unusually high degree or
are linked to a widely distributed set of neighbors. This ob-
servation led to a model, proposed by Kasturirangan in [6],
in which the graph construction begins with a 1- dimensional
lattice, but instead of rewiring edges, a number of extra ver-
tices are added, and are connected to a large number of
vertices on the main lattice, chosen at random. This model
is still similar to the Watts model in that shortcuts will be
created between randomly chosen positions on the lattice
and this model will also display the small-world effect.
Another model of small-world graphs has been proposed by
Albert et al. [3]. In their work, the authors analyzed the
World Wide Web graph and concluded that the Web is dom-
inated by a small number of very highly connected sites.
They found that the degree distribution of the WWW graph
is a power law: the probability that a node has a degree k
is proportional to 1/kp for some positive p > 1, where p
is called the power factor. Therefore, they suggested the
following graph model: a normal random graph with an av-
erage degree k is rewired such that its degree distribution
becomes a power law. In each iteration of this graph con-
struction algorithm, a pair of vertices is chosen randomly
and an edge is added between them, only if a newly created
edge brings the overall degree distribution closer to the re-
quired power law. By repeating this process long enough,
a graph is generated with the correct power law. But, this
graph is in other respects a random graph with a very low
clustering coefficient.
The analysis of Adamic [2] confirms that WWW graphs are
indeed small-world graphs, but shows that these graphs do
have a larger clustering coefficient than random graphs. She
concludes that from this point of view, Albert’s model is
unrealistic for the modelling of WWW graphs.
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Figure 3: The evolution of the size of the largest
strongly connected component of the PGP graph.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE PGP CERTIFICATE
GRAPH
In the introduction, we explained our motivation for explor-
ing the characteristics of the certificate graphs for the pro-
vision of security services in self-organized systems. In this
section, we present the analysis of the PGP certificate graphs
that is, to our knowledge, the only known example of a self-
organized certificate graph creation.
We extracted the database containing the PGP certificate
graph from the public PGP certificate directories. One of
these directories can be found at http://pgp.dtype.org. This
database contains the information about public-keys and
public-key certificates issued and revoked from the launch
of the PGP project (early 1990’s) until today. This infor-
mation enables us to follow the evolution of the PGP certifi-
cate graph and to observe its characteristics as they change
over this time period. The graph analysis that we present
makes sense only if connected graphs are analyzed. There-
fore, in our analysis, we focus on the characteristics of the
largest strongly connected component of the PGP certificate
graphs. The evolution of the sizes of both the PGP certifi-
cate graph and its largest strongly connected component is
shown in Figures 2 and 3. Observing the characteristics
of the second largest strongly connected component of the
PGP certificate graph did not make sense as it contained
few vertices (32 vertices, for the 2001 PGP graph).
To show that the PGP certificate graphs exhibit small-world
properties, we observed the following graph characteristics
of its largest strongly connected component:
• directed clustering coefficient
• directed φ-coefficient
• directed characteristic length
• graph diameter
• length scaling
• vertex degree distribution
• median and mean in-degree and out-degree
• largest strongly connected component size
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Figure 4: The directed characteristic length of the
largest strongly connected component of the PGP
graph.
where directed φ-coefficient and directed characteristic length
are generalizations of the Watts [13] definitions of the same
graph characteristics to directed graphs. The directed φ co-
efficient is defined as a fraction of directed shortcuts in the
total number of edges. The directed shortcut is defined as a
directed edge that, when it is removed, the shortest directed
path (in the same direction as the edge that is removed) be-
tween two nodes previously connected by that edge becomes
strictly larger than two. The directed characteristic length
of a graph G is defined as the median of the means of the
directed shortest path lengths connecting each vertex to all
other vertices in G.
The results of our analysis, presented on Figures 4, 5 and 6,
show that PGP certificate graphs have (i) a small directed
characteristic length, (ii) a high clustering coefficient, and
(iii) slower than logarithmic length scaling. These results
clearly show that the PGP certificate graphs do exhibit
small-world characteristics.
A high φ-coefficient (Figure 6) can be explained by the fact
that the trust relationships in the PGP community are often
created between very distant (e.g. geographically distant)
users. Figure 7 shows the PGP certificate graph diameter.
To compare PGP graphs with the graphs generated by the
existing small-world models, we investigated the in-degree,
out-degree and degree distributions of the PGP certificate
graphs. The results of this analysis are shown on Figure 9.
Clearly, the vertex degree distribution of the PGP graph is
neither bimodal (like in Kasturirangani’s small-world model),
nor does it obey the power law (like in Albert’s small-world
model), nor do all vertices have approximately the same de-
grees (like in Watts’ φ-model), but it resembles to the Zipf’s
distribution. Zipf’s law, named after the Harvard linguistic
professor George Kingsley Zipf (1902-1950), is the observa-
tion that frequency of occurrence of some event (P ), as a
function of the rank (k) when the rank is determined by
the above frequency of occurrence, is a power-law function
Pk ∼ 1/kp with the exponent p close to unity.
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Figure 5: The directed clustering coefficient of the
largest strongly connected component of the PGP
graph.
4. CONSTRUCTING A MODEL OF THE
CERTIFICATE GRAPH
In the previous section, we studied the characteristics of the
PGP certificate graphs, as these graphs represent the closest
existing example to the certificate graph creation in fully
self-organized systems. In this section we propose a model
for the generation of this kind of graphs, which will make it
possible to generate certificate graphs of an arbitrary size.
Here, we argue that the certificate graphs in self-organized
systems will exhibit small-world properties, as the creation
of the certificate graphs depends on the existing trust re-
lationships between people. In self-organized systems, if
users are properly stimulated, their mutual acquaintances
will eventually result in public-key certificates. We do not
claim that the certificate graph will precisely map users’ ac-
quaintances, as the certificates do not express friendship, but
the user confidence in a given user-key binding. It is how-
ever, reasonable to expect that most of the acquaintances
will result in public-key certificates. It has been already
shown by Milgram’s experiment and argued in [13] that peo-
ple’s acquaintances do form a small-world graph. All this
gives us reasonable assurance that the certificate graphs in
self-organized systems will closely resemble graphs of user
acquaintances. The presented PGP certificate graph anal-
ysis gives us additional assurance in our claim that certifi-
cate graphs in self-organized systems are indeed small-world
graphs. Here, we do not consider the certificate graph cre-
ation where users are given other incentives, besides their
acquaintances, to issue public key certificates, as these in-
centives could unpredictably change the certificate graphs.
As already discussed at the end of the previous section,
the existing small-world graph models generate certificate
graphs with unrealistic degree distributions. Even without
observing specifically the PGP certificate graphs, it seems
very counterintuitive that all the people have an approxi-
mately equal number of acquaintances, like it is proposed
in the Watts model. It is more realistic to assume that,
like in the PGP degree distribution, a majority of people
have a small number of acquaintances, fewer people have
more acquaintances, and just a few people are very well so-
cially connected and have a large number of acquaintances.
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Figure 6: The directed φ-coefficient of the largest
strongly connected component of the PGP graph.
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Figure 7: The diameter of the largest strongly con-
nected component of the PGP graph.
Albert’s model, on the other hand, takes into account the
vertex degree distribution, but the graphs generated by this
model are random graphs with a small clustering coefficient.
For the reasons stated above, we find that the existing small-
world graph models do not correctly model certificate graphs.
Therefore, we propose a new model for the generation of
small-world certificate graphs, which we call certificate graph
model. This model generates certificate graphs that have: (i)
a small characteristic length that scales logarithmically or
slower than logarithmically with the size of the graph, (ii)
a high clustering coefficient and (iii) predefined in-degree,
out-degree and degree distributions, similar to those of the
PGP certificate graphs.
Our certificate graph model follows the same logic as Watts
φ-model, as it singles out shortcuts as the main cause of the
small-world effect. However, in our model, we use a different
substrate. Instead of rewiring a regular 1-lattice, where each
vertex has the same degree, we rewire an irregular lattice-like
graph in the same fashion as in the φ-model. By irregular
we mean that vertices on that graph do not necessarily have
the same degrees.
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Figure 8: The in-degree, out-degree and degree dis-
tributions of the small-world certificate graph gener-
ated by the certificate graph model, with the model
parameters that match the characteristics of the
PGP September 2001 certificate graph.
We construct our substrate graph in the following way:
• Given a set V of vertices and given in-degree kinv and
out-degree koutv for each v ∈ V .
• every vertex v is joined to its neighbors uk and wk as
specified by:
forall v ∈ V
k = 0
for i = 1 to |V |
u = [(v − i) + |V |] (mod |V |)
if indeg(u) ≤ kinu, then uk = u
and k = k + 1
if k ≥ bkoutv/2c then stop
k = 0
for i = 1 to |V |
w = (v + i) (mod |V |);
if indeg(w) ≤ kinw, then wk = w
and k = k + 1
if k ≥ bkoutv/2c then stop
The obtained substrate graph is created in the same fashion
as the 1-lattice, but with a specified degree distribution.
We call a graph generated by this construction an irregular
lattice.
Here, we define our certificate graph model:
1. Construct an irregular lattice graph according to the
predefined degree distribution.
2. Specify a desired φ.
3. “Randomly rewire” the irregular lattice with the con-
straint that φ · |E| of its edges are forced to be short-
cuts. Specifically:
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Figure 9: In-degree, out-degree and degree distribu-
tions of the largest strongly connected component of
the 2001 PGP graph.
(a) Pick a vertex u at random
(b) Pick a neighbor v such that an edge between u
and v is not a shortcut.
(c) Delete edge (u, v)
(d) Create shortcut (u,w), such that w is chosen ran-
domly
(e) Choose a non-shortcut edge e connected to w
(f) Disconnect e from w and connect it to v
We validated our model by generating artificial certificate
graphs with input parameters that are similar to those of
the PGP certificate graphs. As a predefined degree distri-
bution, we used the approximation of the vertex degree dis-
tributions of the PGP certificate graphs. The other graph
construction parameters (number of vertices and edges, φ
coefficient) were taken from the characteristics of the PGP
certificate graphs.
We generated 18 artificial certificate graphs with the con-
struction parameters obtained from 18 different PGP graphs
(1996-2001, three graphs from each year). We repeated this
experiment 20 times for each set of characteristics. The re-
sults of our simulations are shown in the Figures 8, 10 and
10.
In Figure 8 we display the degree distributions of the certifi-
cate graph generated with the same parameters as in the
PGP September 2001 certificate graph and with the ap-
proximation of the vertex degree distribution as previously
described. This figure shows that our model successfully
generates graphs with given vertex degree distributions. A
comparison of clustering coefficients of the PGP graph and
the graphs generated by our model is given in Figure 10.
We can see that the graphs generated by our model have a
slightly larger clustering coefficient then the PGP certificate
graphs. Figure 11 shows that the graphs generated with our
model exhibit the same length scaling as the PGP certificate
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Figure 10: Directed clustering coefficients of PGP
graphs and artificial graphs generated by the cer-
tificate graph model when the artificial graphs are
generated with the same model parameters as PGP
graphs.
graph and a very small characteristic length. These results
demonstrate that with the proposed certificate graph model
we can successfully generate artificial certificate graphs of
arbitrary size and of appropriate graph characteristics.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have observed the emergence of the small-
world phenomenon in fully self-organized systems, and its
significance to system security. As self-organized security
systems do not exist today, it is difficult to predict what
the characteristics of the certificate graphs that would be
created in these systems will be. Fortunately, PGP provides
a very useful analogy and reveals the way in which certificate
graphs will likely emerge in fully self-organized systems.
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the PGP certifi-
cate graph. It shows that PGP certificate graphs exhibit
small-world characteristics. It provides a study of the appro-
priateness of existing small-world graph models for the rep-
resentation of these kind of graphs. It concludes that some
modifications to the existing models are necessary and pro-
poses the corresponding modifications. The proposed model
can be used to construct certificate graphs of any size.
In terms of future work, we intend to study in more detail the
mechanisms by which trust emerges in fully self-organized
systems. In this way, we can check to what extent the PGP
certificate graph is really representative. We believe that
this analysis can be an excellent basis to devise and compare
solutions to the challenging problem of providing security in
fully self-organized systems.
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